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Abstract 
 
This analysis of public opinion towards foreign aid shows that 
Canadians are divided over internationalism. First, while most citizens agree 
that development assistance is important, their support often remains shallow, 
unmatched by a commitment to undertake concrete actions. Second, the 
attitudes Canadians hold toward development assistance indicate that there is 
a clear division in the country’s public between liberal and conservative 
internationalists, a cleavage that is anchored in domestic ideological and 
partisan differences. In many ways comparable to what is found in other 
countries, the internationalism of Canadians does not appear as vigorous and 
as consensual as is often suggested. 
 
 
 
 
 DIVIDED OVER INTERNATIONALISM: 
THE CANADIAN PUBLIC AND DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE 
 
 
 “A majority of Canadians,” notes Evan Potter in a recent paper, 
“continue to support a multilateralist, activist, social values-driven foreign 
policy” and supports peacekeeping and foreign aid as Canada’s “most positive 
contributions to the world.”  This internationalism, however, may be changing, 
to become less altruistic and more anchored in interests, or “results-oriented” 
(Potter 2002, 6 and 14).  With respect to development assistance, for 
instance, Canadians remain supportive, but many express worries that aid 
may make poor countries “too dependent” and prefer aid programs that 
assure “a clear benefit to Canada” (Potter 2002, 15-16). 
Is this emphasis on results really new?  Or are such worries about the 
effectiveness of aid a perennial feature of the public opinion landscape?  How 
do we reconcile these expressed doubts with what appears to be an enduring 
support for development assistance, even when aid budgets were declining?  
For various methodological and political reasons, these questions have 
received little attention so far.  Convinced that Canadians are strongly 
committed to internationalism, scholars have generally assumed a broad and 
relatively stable consensus on foreign policy matters (Munton 2002-03, 158-
59). When considered closely, however, this consensus often seems weak or 
ambiguous, because it is a construct that integrates views and attitudes that 
do not always fit together very well.  As they emphasized the Canadian 
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tradition of internationalism, most observers tended to overlook differences, 
and focused instead on a more or less coherent and widely shared vision of 
the country’s role in world politics.  The problem, as Don Munton and Tom 
Keating explain in a recent article on the question, is that “internationalism 
divides Canadians as well as binds them” (2001, 547). While there is a strong 
consensus on an active involvement in foreign affairs and on economic 
internationalism, important divergences remain regarding the country’s 
relationships with the United States, development assistance and security 
issues.  With respect to foreign aid and the arms race, for instance, Munton 
and Keating speak of “marked disagreement” and “even some polarization of 
views” (2001, 545). Unfortunately, we know little about these divisions and 
about their impact on policy.  One may suspect that they are rooted in 
domestic politics, but the study of this link has been left largely unexplored 
(Munton and Keating 2001, 540). 
This article uses the case of public support for foreign aid to probe 
further the nature of Canadian internationalism. Along with peacekeeping, 
development assistance has been a pillar of the Pearsonian internationalism 
that, for a long time, has defined Canada’s external relations (Cooper, 1997, 
210). This aspect of Canadian foreign policy, however, has generated 
contrasted views among the public.  Strongly supported in principle, 
development assistance has not been endorsed without reservations and in a 
universal way by Canadians.  Canadians are divided over internationalism, on 
at least two counts. First, they are divided in the sense that they seem to be of 
two minds, and hold ambivalent views about foreign aid. While most citizens 
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agree that development assistance is important, their support often remains 
shallow, unmatched by a commitment to undertake concrete actions. Second, 
the attitudes Canadians hold toward development assistance indicate that 
there is a clear division in the country’s public between liberal and 
conservative internationalists, a cleavage that is anchored in domestic 
ideological and partisan differences. This division is similar to the American 
ideological cleavage described by Eugene Wittkopf and Ole Holsti, and is also 
compatible with a host of comparative findings on public support for foreign 
aid (Wittkopf 1990, 215; Holsti 1996, 134, 151-56, and 183; Lumsdaine 1993, 
137-79; Thérien 2002). In many ways comparable to the attitudes found in 
other countries, the internationalism of Canadians does not appear as 
vigorous and as consensual as is often suggested. 
The article begins with a presentation of the evolution of Canadian 
development assistance policy, to underline the contrast between an official 
discourse that has remained generous and financial commitments that have 
declined significantly over the years.  The second section surveys public 
support for foreign aid in Canada, to see how it compares to the situation in 
other donor countries, how it has evolved over time, and how it relates to 
public attitudes about other domestic and international policies.  This section 
confirms the image of a supportive but ambiguous citizenry.  To explain this 
apparent ambivalence, the third section establishes that Canadian public 
opinion on development assistance is defined by a left-right split, which 
separates a favorable public, with liberal political and ideological orientations, 
and a more reluctant one, with conservative preferences and ideas.i The 
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conclusion suggests rethinking development assistance, and more broadly 
internationalism, in the context of a closing gap between domestic and foreign 
policy (Potter 2002, 3).  For most citizens, politics at home and politics abroad 
are far from being watertight compartments.  Attitudes on foreign affairs 
basically reflect the same values that shape domestic politics.  Public opinion 
should thus be understood from a perspective that accounts for this 
interconnection (Noël and Thérien 2002). 
 
Canadian Development Assistance: 
Ambitious Discourse, Modest Achievements 
 
Because Canada is a prosperous middle power with no colonial past, 
aid has sometimes been presented as a “Canadian vocation” (Canada 1986, 
88).  For the past few years, however, this perception has had at best a 
remote relationship with reality.  In this area as in many others, Canada has 
increasingly taken on the appearance of a “fading power” (Hillmer and Molot 
2002). 
 Originally, as was the case elsewhere in the developed world, 
Canadian foreign aid arose in response to a broad spectrum of needs and 
social forces (Morrison 1998).  It should first be recalled that aid was invented 
at the beginning of the Cold War more as a tool in the struggle against 
communism than as an instrument to fight poverty. Before anything else, 
Canada’s development assistance policy thus served to strengthen the geo-
strategic and economic bases of the liberal order established in the postwar 
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period.  Beyond this objective, shared by all advanced capitalist countries, 
foreign aid could also facilitate the promotion of specifically Canadian 
interests.  Development assistance came to be seen, in particular, as an 
effective means to rectify the almost total absence of relations between 
Canada and the Third World, and to affirm the country’s foreign policy 
autonomy vis-à-vis the United States. Canadian aid was also clearly shaped 
by the evolution of the country’s political values and institutions, especially 
those related to the development of the welfare state.  In many respects, 
Canadian aid policy can be understood as an outward projection of the 
principles underlying domestic social policies (Thérien and Noël 1994). 
Cranford Pratt aptly summarized this defining tension between interests and 
principles when he described Canadian aid policy as consistently torn 
between the two competing rationales of “international realism” and “humane 
internationalism” (Pratt 1989, 13-22; Pratt 2000, 37-59). 
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Figure 1. Aid as a percentage of GNP
(1950-2000)
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Sources:  CIDA 2002a, 1; OECD, various years. 
Note: The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) includes Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United 
States. In 2000, the concept of Gross National Product (GNP) was replaced 
by the concept of Gross National Income (GNI). 
 
For many years, Canada had a reputation of generosity toward the 
developing world.  In the record year of 1975, for instance, Canada devoted 
0.53% of its GNP to international co-operation (see Figure 1). This 
performance remained short of the government’s repeated promise to reach 
the 0.7% target set by the United Nations in 1970, but it placed Canada 
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among the front-runners of the donor community. Until the late 1980s, the 
country’s aid policy remained about half way between the conservative 
policies of the G7 countries and the far more progressive policies of the North 
European countries (Thérien 1996). Two characteristics also helped give 
Canadian aid programs an identity of their own: a bias in favour of the 
multilateral system and a very widespread distribution of funds. Through its 
solid support for international development organizations such as the United 
Nations Development Programme and the World Bank, Canada wanted to 
demonstrate that it was not as preoccupied as other countries by the 
promotion of its own national interests. In addition, as a country of the 
Americas, and a member of both the Commonwealth and the Francophonie, 
Canada has always felt the need to assert its presence in every corner of the 
Third World.  Canadian aid policy, wrote Jim Freedman, “has sought (…) to be 
everything to everyone” (2000, 13).  Despite the inherent impossibility of such 
an objective, the fact remains that, for more than a generation, aid allowed 
Canada to stand as a “Samaritan state” (Spicer 1966) and to express the 
“bright side of [the country’s] national character” (Canada 1994, 47). 
 The end of the Cold War and the federal government’s effort throughout 
the 1990s to eliminate the deficit significantly weakened the country’s 
involvement in the field of development assistance.  Canada was actually one 
of the donor countries most affected by the worldwide phenomenon of aid 
fatigue. Between 1991 and 1999, Canadian aid dropped by 33% in current 
value.ii  After reaching 0.45% in 1991, the aid/GNP ratio fell to 0.25% in 2000, 
a performance that pulled Canada down from the 7th to the 16th position 
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among OECD donor countries.  Even within the G7, Canada’s position then 
was a poor 5th, behind France, the United Kingdom, Japan, and Germany.  
Revealingly, the government now avoids all reference to the UN target of 
0.7%. Critics have also put the quality of Canadian aid into question by 
drawing attention to the political, strategic, and economic objectives that 
constantly compete with developmental goals.  In fact, the Canadian 
government institutionalized this competition in its 1995 foreign policy 
statement, according to which development assistance “promotes prosperity 
and employment, protects global security and projects Canadian values and 
culture” (Canada 1995). Perhaps as a reflection of this confusion in policy 
objectives, Canada is among the rich countries that devote the smallest 
proportion of their aid budget to the least developed countries, the poorest of 
the poor. 
 Canada does continue to stand out for the originality of its policies in 
certain spheres, such as the active collaboration with non-governmental 
organizations, the promotion of gender equality, and the protection of the 
environment.  It should also be stressed that development assistance has 
begun to benefit from the country’s improved fiscal situation. In 2002, Prime 
Minister Jean Chrétien announced a long-term commitment to increase aid 
resources by 8% a year (CIDA 2002b, 2). The same year, the focus on Africa 
during the G8 Summit in Kananaskis led the government to create the Canada 
Fund for Africa, with a budget of $500 million over three years (Tomlinson 
2002a). Overall, however, in spite of these recent initiatives and of a 
sophisticated discourse emphasizing poverty reduction and the need to 
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promote the developing countries’ ownership of aid programs, Canada is no 
longer the leader it once was in matters of development assistance. 
 The Canadian government has generally proposed that citizens were 
aware of the country’s financial situation and supported the changes made to 
aid policy.  Yet this interpretation — suggesting that Canadians have likely 
become less “humane” and more “realist” than in the past — has rarely been 
the object of empirical verification.  This is the purpose of the next section.  
 
The Canadian Public and Foreign Aid: 
Supportive But Not Very Attentive 
 
 The few analyses that have been conducted on Canadian public 
attitudes toward development assistance tend to reinforce the idea that, in this 
country, aid is a consensual issue. Canadians are usually presented as 
supportive of foreign aid, and their attitudes are depicted as fairly stable over 
time. At the end of the 1980s, for instance, Réal Lavergne noted that “one 
usually finds between 75 per cent and 80 per cent of the population to be in 
favour of current or increased aid levels” (1989, 38). The number of 
respondents in favour of increased levels, Lavergne added, “has remained 
approximately constant over the last twenty years” (1989, 40).  A decade later, 
Ian Smillie concluded in the same vein that, in spite of some fluctuations in the 
Canadians' support for aid, “the long-term trend has shown little significant 
change upward or downward, and it remains at the relatively high levels that 
have prevailed for the better part of two decades” (Smillie 1998a, 58). This 
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picture is fundamentally correct but, as we will see, it remains too general to 
be entirely satisfying. Indeed, many of the basic conflicts that shape Canadian 
politics, both in its domestic and foreign affairs dimensions, are reflected in 
public attitudes towards aid.  When we pay attention to these conflicts, we 
obtain a more nuanced, less monolithic view of the Canadian public.  Before 
we introduce these distinctions, however, we must first revisit the Canadian 
consensus. 
Overall, the Canadian public does appear highly supportive of foreign 
aid.  An Ipsos-Reid survey presented to the Department of Foreign Affairs and 
International Trade in September 2001 confirms the earlier findings of 
Lavergne and Smillie.  According to this survey, 76.4% of Canadians consider 
that it is important for their country to pursue the promotion of assistance to 
poorer countries, while only 11.2% think that this foreign policy objective is not 
important (12.4% are neutral).iii  53% of the respondents also agree that 
Canada should give more aid to developing countries, while only 26% 
disagree  (21% are neutral).iv  The fact that public support for more generous 
levels of foreign aid is lower than the support for the very principle of 
development assistance is to be expected, since the commitment evoked in 
the budget increase question is more explicit and important.  The gap between 
these two questions, however, indicates that the Canadian consensus over 
foreign aid is weaker and more fragile than what is often suggested.  It is 
telling that only a small majority (53%) favor increased budgets, even though 
the previous decade was marked by a drastic reduction of the country’s aid 
effort. 
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This limited support for what, in fact, would be a movement back toward 
Canada’s traditional policies, may in part be explained by the public’s lack of 
information on the issue.  In Canada and elsewhere, most studies converge to 
suggest that public opinion on development assistance is “often misinformed 
and based on exaggerated perceptions of the size of aid budgets, or weak 
understanding of development co-operation” (OECD 2001, 1). On average, 
Canadians think that 10.5% of the federal budget is devoted to aid; only 20% 
know that, in fact, it amounts to less than 2% (Tomlinson 2002b, 3).  When 
told of the actual size of the aid budget, respondents tend to become  more 
supportive of higher expenditures. In an Environics poll presented to the 
Canadian International Development Agency in October 1998, the percentage 
of persons who considered that the country's aid budget was not sufficient 
increased from 24% to 44% when respondents were informed of the real 
amount of money that the federal government spent on development 
assistance (Environics Research Inc. 1998). These results suggest that public 
support for increased aid budget would probably be higher if Canadians were 
better informed about the cutbacks of recent years. 
In a cross-national perspective, Canadian support for foreign aid is 
about average, and the country stands very much as the quintessential 
“middle” power. As can be seen in Table 1 below, among the 17 countries for 
which comparable data are available, Canada occupies the median position: 8 
countries show a higher level of public support for development assistance 
than Canada, and 8 countries a lower level. The countries where support is 
stronger than in Canada can be divided in two main groups: those of Northern 
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Europe, where development assistance has long been a foreign policy priority 
(the Netherlands, Denmark, and Sweden), and countries of Southern Europe, 
which have themselves benefited from European regional development 
programs (Spain, Greece, Italy, and Portugal) (Noël and Thérien 2002, 645). 
Canadians’ attitudes toward aid are more positive, however, than what is the 
case in 4 out of the 5 G7 countries for which data are available (the United 
Kingdom, France, Germany, and the United States).  The contrast with the 
United States, the only country where less than half of the population (46%) 
supports foreign aid, is particularly striking.  In spite of the close economic 
integration and cultural proximity between the two countries, Canadians and 
Americans remain divided in their views regarding the role of rich countries 
toward poor countries, just as they are over a variety of other public policies 
(Perlin 1997; Hoberg 2002).  Overall, the level of support for the aid program 
in Canada is remarkably similar to what is found in Europe.  In 1998, 76% of 
Europeans thought that foreign aid was an important goal to pursue, and 51% 
of them agreed that their national governments should give more aid to poor 
countries (INRA 1999, 2). Such results are almost identical to those of the 
2001 Ipsos-Reid survey mentioned above. 
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Table 1: Support for the Aid Program in North America 
and Europev 
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Sources: For Canada: Ipsos-Reid 2001; for the United States: Chicago 
Council of Foreign Relations, 2000; for Europe: INRA 1999.vi 
 
Over time, Canadian attitudes toward development assistance have not 
varied much, less in fact than Canadian policy. As in most other OECD 
countries, overall, public support for aid “has not declined in the past decade” 
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(OECD 2001, 1). This does not mean that the public does not respond to the 
policy context.  Public attitudes do fluctuate from one year to another. Various 
surveys have shown higher levels of support in the early 1990s and lower 
levels in the mid-1990s. In the 1993-95 period, in particular, when the fight 
against the budget deficit was the utmost priority of the government, the 
proportion of Canadians who thought that the government spent the right 
amount or not enough to assist developing countries had dropped to around 
50% (from 76% in 1989; Environics Research Inc. 1998). In a context of 
unprecedented financial restrictions, Canadians were more preoccupied with 
domestic than with foreign policy issues. 
Even when the budgetary context is less difficult, domestic programs 
tend to have the priority.  Canadians are supportive of foreign aid, but they 
simply do not rank it very high among their different concerns.  As can be seen 
in Table 2, in 2000, only 41 % of Canadians thought world poverty should be a 
priority for the federal government (20 % made it a high priority), and even 
less  (36%) said the same for the quality of life in poor countries (a high 
priority for 14% of respondents).  These international development objectives 
ranked well below a series of domestic priorities, including many that were not 
even within the jurisdictions of the federal government.  The main public 
concerns had to do with health care (a priority for 85% of respondents), 
Canadian poverty (80%), crime (76%), the national debt (74%), personal taxes 
(71%), rising tuition fees (69%), greenhouse gas emissions (66%), and early 
childhood development (64%).  Among issues that were given a low priority, 
only Canadian arts (71% of respondents made it a low priority) ranked behind 
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quality of life in poor countries (63%) and world poverty (57%).  Public support 
for foreign aid, it has been said, tends to be “a mile wide and an inch deep” 
(Smillie 1998b, 23). The contrast between the high support expressed by 
Canadians and the relatively low importance they give to the issue seems in 
line with this assessment.  The fact that Canadians give more importance to 
domestic issues than to the reduction of world poverty is not surprising.  This 
is indeed the situation that prevails in most donor countries, and it probably 
reflects the common view that “charity begins at home.”  In Canada, however, 
the gap between the public’s preoccupation with world poverty and its 
concerns for domestic issues, including poverty in Canada, appears 
particularly wide.  In this respect, Canadians’ attitudes seem close to those 
that prevail in some European countries that are less supportive of foreign aid, 
and more preoccupied by domestic inequalities (Austria, Belgium, France) 
(Noël and Thérien 2002, 642-45). 
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Table 2:  The Public Policy Priorities of Canadians 
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Source: Earnscliffe Research and Communications 2000.vii 
 
 When comparing foreign aid with other foreign policy priorities, we also 
see the limits of public support for “humane internationalism.” Table 3 
presents 15 foreign policy goals that Canadians were asked to assess in the 
2001 Ipsos-Reid survey.  Assisting poor countries was the policy priority that 
elicited the least “very important” assessments (27%).  The issue ranked near 
the bottom of the list of “important” or “very important” objectives, with 76% of 
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respondents saying it was important, a rate similar to that obtained for 
reducing illegal immigration (75%), promoting Canadian culture (76%), or 
improving Canada-US relations (77%), but quite below protecting Canada's 
natural resources (97%), preventing the spread of infectious diseases (95%), 
protecting the environment (95%), preventing international terrorism (90%), 
and promoting trade opportunities (89%). At the very least, this order of 
preferences suggests that aid is no more than one of many Canada's 
vocations. 
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Table 3: The Foreign Policy Priorities of Canadians 
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Source: Ipsos-Reid 2001.  See endnote 7 for the exact question. 
 
One reason often evoked to explain Canadians’ lukewarm support for 
development assistance is a high degree of skepticism about the 
effectiveness of the aid program.viii The Ipsos-Reid survey indicates that, in 
2001, 50% of Canadians believed that aid made poor countries too 
dependent, and as much as 37% thought that it would not make a difference 
even in the poorest countries.  Such attitudes are fairly similar to what is found 
in Europe and in the United States, where citizens are also concerned about 
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the use of development resources and, above all, about the possibility that aid 
be granted to non-democratic governments that violate human rights.  As Ian 
Smillie notes, there is a widely shared perception that “aid has little impact, is 
used for self-serving purposes, and is being wasted by bureaucrats and 
dictators alike.”  Such “public disenchantment,” argues Smillie, is not 
equivalent to “compassion fatigue” (1998b, 21 and 24). Still, in Canada as 
elsewhere, many citizens have doubts about foreign aid. 
 While the exact reasons for Canadians’ skepticism remain difficult to 
evaluate with precision, what is certain, however, is that collectively 
Canadians appear profoundly ambivalent, if not incoherent, about foreign aid.  
Consider, for instance, the interplay between principles and interests that 
emerge in the 2001 Ipsos-Reid survey.  That year, a majority of Canadians 
(67%) believed that social values such as the protection of the environment 
and the promotion of human rights should be the driving forces behind 
Canada's foreign policy. Only 32% of respondents thought that the country's 
external relations should be guided primarily by economic objectives such as 
increasing trade opportunities. At the same time, responses to some 
questions related to aid indicated a strong tendency to focus on the national 
interest. A majority of Canadians (61%), for example, believed that aid should 
be given primarily to countries where there is a clear benefit to Canada (23% 
disagreed with this proposition, and 16% were neutral). In the same 
perspective, Africa was considered to be the least important region for 
Canadian foreign policy, even though it was certainly the continent where 
development needs were the greatest. 
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 To sum up, Canadians appear supportive of foreign aid in principle, at a 
level that is constant over time and comparable to that found in European 
countries, but their generosity remains guarded.  Support for increases in aid 
budget stays much below the support expressed for aid in general and, when 
compared to other domestic and international priorities, aid is surpassed by 
practically all issues of interest to Canadians.  Canadians wish a foreign policy 
anchored in social values, but they worry about the effectiveness of 
development assistance and consider aid should be distributed with an eye for 
Canadian interests.  To some extent, these ambivalent views parallel those of 
the Canadian government whose sophisticated and generous development 
rhetoric has not been matched by policy and expenditures in the last decade.  
As the next section shows, the tensions identified here may well be a 
reflection of political conflicts within the Canadian public rather than of mere 
incoherence.  
 
Two Publics? 
The Left, the Right, and Development Assistance 
 
Development assistance is a political issue, anchored in a country’s 
domestic politics.  As a form of income redistribution, it raises all the core 
questions that divide the left and the right in liberal democracies, questions 
that have to do with human development, freedom, equality and the role of 
individual and collective actions.  The rhetoric of the left about aid typically 
evokes social justice, solidarity and public commitments, whereas discourses 
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on the right refer instead to dependency, inefficiency, and waste.  In countries 
where social-democratic parties have been powerful and where they have 
built a generous and universal welfare state, foreign aid tends to be at a high 
level (Noël and Thérien 1995; Thérien and Noël 2000). Where conservatives 
have dominated, domestic inequalities remain more important and they tend 
to prevail in the public’s mind, over international development issues (Noël 
and Thérien 2002). Not surprisingly, individuals and groups on the left tend to 
be more favorable to international redistribution, whereas people and social 
forces on the right are generally more skeptical and reluctant (Lumsdaine 
1993; Thérien 2002). Behind their broad but relatively thin consensus on 
internationalism and foreign aid, Canadians are therefore likely to be divided 
along political lines, on foreign aid just as on other foreign or domestic issues. 
 The Environics survey of 1998 suggests that indeed Canadians are 
divided between left and right over development assistance. Less than 30% of 
the respondents who identified themselves as supporters of the New 
Democratic Party (27%), of the Bloc québécois (28%), and of the Liberal Party 
of Canada (29%) considered that too much was spent on foreign aid, whereas 
more than 40% of respondents who identified themselves as supporters of 
conservative parties thought Canada spent too much (43% of the supporters 
of the Progressive Conservative party, and 46% of those who identified with 
the Reform Party) (Environics Research Inc. 1998). These results are in line 
with the ideological positions of Canadian parties, which clearly differentiate 
themselves on a left-right axis.  The NDP is solidly anchored on the left, the 
Bloc québécois supports Quebec sovereignty and is on the centre-left, the 
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Liberal Party is a left-leaning centrist party, and the Conservatives and the 
Alliance (formerly the Reform party) compete for the conservative votes, with 
the Alliance being somewhat further on the right (Blais, Gigendil, Nadeau and 
Nevitte 2002, 17-33).ix 
The relationship between ideological/partisan orientations and support 
for foreign aid, however, has rarely been tested rigorously.  In fact, the 
question was seldom raised, because practitioners and scholars seemed 
more interested in establishing the contours of the Canadian consensus than 
in exploring the political divisions that underpin public opinion on foreign 
policy.  As a consequence, polls on foreign policy issues rarely asked 
questions about domestic issues or partisan preferences, whereas more 
conventional political surveys left most foreign policy issues aside.  To study 
this relationship between domestic and foreign policy attitudes, we will use 
findings from the post-electoral questionnaire of the 2000 Canadian Election 
Study, which include many questions on individual political preferences (Blais, 
Gidengil, Nadeau and Nevitte 2000). This data set is not without limitations 
since it contains only one question on foreign aid, raised in the context of a 
discussion of a number of domestic spending priorities.x  Still, the Canadian 
Election Study survey offers a unique opportunity to link attitudes about 
development assistance to a number of ideological and partisan orientations. 
To test the validity of the foreign aid question included in the 2000 
Canadian Election Study we have compared it, indirectly, to two similar 
questions, one on support for aid and the other on support for increased aid 
budgets, taken from the 2001 Ipsos-Reid survey.  Table 4 presents the 
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relationships between support for foreign aid, as measured by the three 
questions, and a number of basic socio-economic characteristics, namely age, 
level of education, personal income, gender, region, language, and religiosity.  
The first column indicates the expected direction of the relationship, on the 
basis of the literature on public opinion and foreign aid. 
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Table 4: Socio-economic Correlates of Public Support for the Aid 
Program and for Increased Aid Spending 
 
 Predicted 
Support 
Aid Program 
(Ipsos-Reid) 
Aid Spending 
(Ipsos-Reid) 
Aid Spending 
(CES) 
Age - -.025    -.043 -.016 
Education +  .010       .064*             .039* 
Income -    -.084**       -.078**            -.020 
Gender (women) +      .145***        .067**             .053** 
Region (Quebec) +      .125***         .240***   .018 
Language (French) +      .134***         .223***   .010 
Religiosity +   NA     NA     .062** 
 
Sources: Ipsos-Reid, 2001; Blais, Gidengil, Nadeau, and Nevitte, 2000. 
 
Note: The results are Pearson correlation coefficients. 
Significance levels (two-tailed):  *<.05  **<.01 ***<.001.   
Gender, Region and Language are dummy variables with the value of 1 as 
noted in parentheses.  The exact questions are presented in endnotes 3, 4 
and 10. 
  
 First, it should be noted that the three questions produce relationships 
in the same, expected direction.  Second, findings for the Ipsos-Reid 
questions tend to be more robust, with at least four relationships that are 
significant.  Women, francophones, and Quebec residents are significantly 
more supportive of foreign aid than men, Anglophones and Canadians outside 
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Quebec.  Persons with higher income, on the other hand, are less favorable to 
development assistance.  With the Canadian Election Study question, the 
relationships involving gender, language, region, and income are all in the 
predicted direction, but only gender is significant.  Level of education and 
religiosity, on the other hand, become significant in this case: respondents that 
are more educated or more religious are more likely to approve foreign aid 
than others.  Third, most correlations are not very strong, and this may explain 
why three different questions produce results that are compatible but different.  
We can thus conclude that the Canadian Election Study is a valid assessment 
of support for foreign aid, although without a broader set of questions we must 
remain careful in the interpretation of our findings.  Further, we should note 
that, however significant, socio-economic variables may not be the best 
predictors of support for foreign aid.  Ideological and partisan orientations 
could well be more important. 
 Table 5 below presents descriptive data on the level of support for 
increased spending on foreign aid, according to a respondent’s ideological 
and partisan orientations.  The results indicate clearly the ideological 
underpinnings of support for foreign aid, with people who place themselves on 
the left being much more likely to approve higher expenditures (32%) than 
people who consider themselves to be in the political centre (17%) or on the 
right (15%).  Partisan figures are even more striking, with new democrats at 
40% of support and conservatives and reformists around 10%.  Liberals and 
Bloc québécois voters stand in the middle with 20% and 18% of respondents 
approving increases in spending.xi 
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Table 5: Ideological and Partisan Orientations and Support 
for Increased Aid Spending 
 
 
 
Source: Blais, Gidengil, Nadeau, and Nevitte 2000. 
 
 Table 6 presents the correlations between ideological self-placement, 
partisan orientations, and support for increases in foreign aid, and confirms 
that all these relationships are in the expected direction and significant.  First, 
there is a strong positive relationship between ideological self-placement and 
partisan views, which confirms the relevance of the left-right orientations of 
Canadian parties.  Second, the relationships between personal political views 
and support for increased aid budget are also positive and significant, with 
people on the left and centre-left more likely to support such increases.  Our 
     
  
 
 
27 
results echo the findings of Wittkopf and Holsti on the ideological divisions that 
define the foreign policy orientations of the American public (Wittkopf 1990; 
Holsti 1996). They suggest, as we hypothesized, that Canadians are divided 
over internationalism, along left-right ideological and partisan lines.  These 
findings are also compatible with those of Lumsdaine, who has probed 
extensively the ideological foundations of support for foreign aid, and with our 
own comparative work, which associated support for foreign aid with domestic 
political orientations (Lumsdaine 1993; Noël and Thérien 2002). 
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Table 6: Correlations Between Ideological and Partisan Orientations, 
and Support for Increased Aid Spending 
 
  Right to left self-
placement scale 
Increase aid spending 
levels  
 
Right to left self-
placement scale 
 
 
 
.147*** 
 
Partisan affiliation from 
right to left 
 
.444*** 
 
.156*** 
 
Source: Blais, Gidengil, Nadeau, and Nevitte 2000. 
 
Note: The results are Pearson correlation coefficients. 
Significance levels (two-tailed):  *<.05  **<.01 ***<.001. 
 
 
The Canadian Election Study being an extensive survey of political 
attitudes, we also have the possibility of going one step further, to see how 
support for increased foreign aid budgets relates to a host of other ideological 
orientations, which can be seen as dimensions of the broader left-right debate.  
Table 7 below presents the most plausible and interesting relationships. 
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Table 7: Political, Economic and Social Beliefs, and Support 
for Increased Aid Spending 
 
Political Beliefs Economic Beliefs Social Beliefs 
 
 
Support for 
Domestic 
Redistribution 
 
 
 .254*** 
 
Support for 
Free-Trade 
 
  .074*** 
 
Support for 
Women's 
Rights 
 
 .168*** 
Confidence in the 
Government 
 
 .208*** Support for 
Trade 
Unions 
  .170*** Dislike for 
Minorities 
-.273*** 
Support for 
Increased 
Defense 
Spending 
.059** People Can 
Find Jobs if 
They Try 
Hard Enough 
 
 -.127*** Dislike  for 
Immigrants 
-.315*** 
Support for 
Peacekeeping 
  .182*** Jobs Should 
be Created 
Only by the 
Private 
Sector 
 
     .031 Dislike  
for Aboriginals 
-.250*** 
    Social 
Traditionalism 
 
-.148*** 
    Support for 
Environmental 
Protection 
 
.085** 
 
Source: Blais, Gidengil, Nadeau, and Nevitte 2000. 
 
Note: The results are Pearson correlation coefficients. 
Significance levels (two-tailed):  *<.05  **<.01 ***<.001. 
 
 
 With respect to political beliefs, the relationship between support for 
domestic redistribution and support for increases in foreign aid budgets yields 
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the strongest correlation (.254***).  This finding is consistent with our 
theoretical expectations that attitudes about aid are anchored in broader views 
about justice and redistribution, and can be understood as a manifestation of 
the political debate between the left and the right.  There is also a strong 
positive relationship between confidence in government and support for 
increased foreign aid budget (.208***).  This result is more difficult to interpret.  
One may assume that confidence in government is a dimension of the left-
right debate, people on the right being more likely to distrust government.  
From this perspective, it would seem logical that citizens who have less 
confidence in government would have more doubts about the effectiveness of 
aid and oppose higher expenditures.  This reasoning, however, is not 
supported by the relationships between confidence in government and the 
respondents’ ideological and partisan orientations, which are not significant.  
This is the case because, in Canada as elsewhere, there is a general decline 
in the public’s confidence in government (Bricker and Greenspon 2001, 6 and 
316-17; Warren 2002). This decline is not driven by conservative views, but 
rather by new values and ideas about politics and democracy.  People who 
distrust government tend to be informed and active citizens.  They are not 
disengaged, but attentive and critical, and they can be found on the left and in 
the centre, as well as on the right (Roese 2002). The relationship between 
confidence in government and support for increased foreign aid budgets must 
therefore be interpreted with prudence.  A low level of confidence cannot 
simply be read as a conservative view. 
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 The last two items in the political beliefs column, support for increased 
defence spending and support for peacekeeping, are both positively and 
significantly related to support for increased aid budgets.  These relationships, 
however, cannot be understood simply as expressions of the left-right debate.  
They probably capture other dimensions of support for internationalism, such 
as a preference for an “activist” foreign policy (Munton and Keating 2001, 537-
39). The same could be said of support for free-trade, which Munton and 
Keating have associated with “economic internationalism” (2001, 537-39). The 
two other items in the economic beliefs column yield significant relationships, 
more in line with our left-right explanation.  Respondents who support trade 
unions are more likely to approve foreign aid, and those who believe that 
“people can find jobs if they try hard enough” tend to disapprove increased aid 
budgets.  Finally, correlations between social beliefs and support for aid are 
also consistent with a left-right interpretation.  Canadians who support 
women’s rights and environmental protection are favorable to development 
assistance, whereas those who dislike minorities, immigrants or aboriginal 
peoples do not.  Predictably, social traditionalism is also negatively correlated 
with support for a more important aid effort. 
 Just as they appear ambivalent in their support for foreign aid, 
Canadians also seem divided over the question.  Those who identify 
themselves on the left, who vote for the NDP and, to a lesser extent, the 
Liberal Party and the Bloc québécois, and who approve income redistribution, 
trade unions, women’s rights and environmental protection, are more likely to 
favour a more generous aid commitment.  Those who place themselves on 
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the right, support the Conservative party or the Alliance, think individuals 
should see for themselves, and dislike minorities tend to disapprove 
development assistance.  Behind the familiar portrait of a public committed to 
“humane internationalism,” we find a more fragile consensus, defined by an 
awkward combination of generous principles and guarded commitments, and 
a divided public, which disagrees on foreign aid, just as it does on most issues 
of political relevance.  These divisions are in part social, cultural and regional: 
a young educated woman from Quebec is more likely to support development 
assistance than an older, less educated but wealthier man from outside 
Quebec.  First and foremost, however, these are political divisions.  The 
ideological and partisan correlates of support for foreign aid make perfect 
sense as the multi-faceted expression of the opposition between the left and 
the right in Canada. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 In the 1990s, the Canadian government dramatically reduced its foreign 
aid effort, to end up becoming one of the least generous donor countries of 
the OECD.  All the while, Canada maintained a relatively progressive, even 
innovative, rhetoric on development assistance, without recognizing the 
widening gap between this discourse and the country’s actual contributions.  
To some extent, the Canadian public shared this ambiguity, as it gave a 
strong approval to development assistance in principle but appeared reluctant 
to accept increases in aid budgets, despite the successive rounds of cutbacks 
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of the 1990s.  In this sense, Canadians were divided, of two minds, over 
internationalism.  They were also divided in a more fundamental and political 
way, between two publics, one on the left more favorable to foreign aid, and 
another on the right, more skeptical, even reluctant.  This division indicates 
the limits of the idea of a consensus on internationalism.  There may be such 
a consensus, but internationalism does not escape politics.  On the contrary, 
attitudes on the subject are closely intertwined with the views Canadians have 
on ideologies, political parties, income distribution, government, trade unions, 
the labour market, social rights, minorities, and the environment.  Foreign aid, 
and probably internationalism in general, belongs to the broader political 
debates that defines Canadian society. 
 This article has examined how a central component of Canadian 
internationalism — development assistance — is anchored in public opinion.  
With the help of data from the Canadian Election Study, a source rarely used 
by scholars of foreign policy, we have been able to tie citizens’ views of 
foreign aid to the cleavages that shape domestic politics in this country.  More 
work should be pursued in this direction, with other foreign policy issues in 
particular.  Our analysis also suggests that Canadians react to development 
assistance in ways that are very similar to what has been found in other donor 
countries.  Future studies should be guided by such a comparative 
perspective, and avoid assuming Canadian internationalism is distinct or 
unique. 
 How important, one may ask, is public opinion on international affairs?  
Many scholars and practitioners assume the public is ignorant and relatively 
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indifferent about foreign policy.  It is true, as we have seen, that foreign aid 
does not rank very high among the preoccupations of Canadians, and issues 
that have low political salience are unlikely to be shaped strongly by public 
attitudes and perceptions (Page 2002, 336-37). The fact that there is little 
direct link between public opinion and a country’s foreign aid is indeed a 
relatively solid, and to many disappointing, finding of comparative scholarship 
on the question (McDonnell and Solignac Lecomte 2002; Olsen 2000). Yet, if 
Canadians are divided, it also means that internationalism is an integral 
component of the broader political debate.  In this sense, public opinion and 
politics will always matter.  In the long run, at least, what Canadians think 
about global justice, and how they deliberate and vote on the matter, will 
influence and shape what their government does in the international arena. 
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NOTES 
i Our study is primarily based on data drawn from four recent national surveys 
that were conducted by Environics Research Inc. (1998), Earnscliffe 
Research and Communications (2000), the Canadian Election Study group 
(Blais, Gidengil, Nadeau and Nevitte, 2000), and Ipsos-Reid (2001). 
ii The following statistics are drawn from OECD, various years. 
iii The exact question is: “I am going to read you a list of goals Canada has for 
its foreign policy and for each I'd like you to tell me how important you think 
it is for Canada to pursue that goal, using a scale of 0 to 10 where 0 means 
not important at all and 10 means very important.  5) Promoting assistance 
to poorer countries.” 
iv The exact question is: “I am going to read you a list of statements about 
Canada's foreign policy and I would like you to tell me whether you agree or 
disagree with each of these statements.  Please respond using a scale from 
0 to 10, where 0 means you strongly disagree and 10 means you strongly 
agree.  12) Canada should give more foreign assistance to developing 
countries.”  
v Variations in the questions make any direct comparison tentative, but the 
results presented here are nevertheless in line with the historical support 
levels observed in most countries.  See, for instance, Smillie and Helmich 
1998, and Stern 1998. 
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vi For Canada, the exact question is presented in endnote 3.  For the United 
States, the question is: “On the whole, do you favour or oppose our giving 
economic aid to other nations?”  For Europe, the question is : “In your 
opinion, it is very important, important, not very important, or not at all 
important to help people in poor countries in Africa, South America, Asia, 
etc. to develop.” 
vii The exact question is: “Thinking just of the federal government, on a 7-point 
scale where 1 means lowest priority, 4 means middle priority, and 7 means 
highest priority, how much priority would you like the government to put on 
[list topics]?” 
viii The same argument has been made to explain American attitudes.  See 
Page and Barabas 2000, 348-50. 
ix This characterization was of course slightly altered with the recent merger of 
the Progressive Conservative party and the Alliance. 
x The exact question is: “Aid to developing countries: should the federal 
government spend more, less, or about the same as now?”  The other 
issues raised randomly in the list are: defence, welfare, pensions and Old 
Age Security, health care, unemployment insurance, and education. 
xi These results are consistent with those of the Environics poll mentioned 
above. 
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